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ALLOCATING LOSS IN SECURITIES FRAUD: TIME TO 
ADOPT A UNIFORM RULE FOR THE SPECIAL CASE OF 
PONZI SCHEMES 
GRANT CHRISTENSEN  
ABSTRACT 
The global financial crisis precipitated a condensing of capital and a 
fall in global equities markets that not only resulted in the necessity of 
government bailouts of the financial industry, but also exposed a number 
of Ponzi schemes that collectively will cost investors tens of billions of 
dollars. With a new wave of litigation by innocent investors against Ponzi 
scheme operators just beginning, and likely to take years to finish, it be-
comes important to clearly identify the methodologies used to value the 
loss and allocate existing assets among the remaining creditors. To that 
end, this Article argues that courts ought to use a comparatively new ap-
proach—the loss to the losing victim methodology originally pioneered in 
criminal law—to determine how equally innocent victims share the losses 
these schemes precipitated. By standardizing the calculation of loss to 
investors in both criminal and civil law, the courts will make the determi-
nation of loss not only considerably easier but also more equitable. 
                                                 
  Grant Christensen was a Lecturer in Law at the University of Toledo College of 
Law during the development of this Article. He is currently a visiting Professor of Law at 
the University of Oregon. He is a graduate of the Ohio State University Moritz College of 
Law and has an LL.M. from the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. I 
would like to thank the University of Toledo for helping provide support that made this 
Article possible. I would also like to thank Vaughn Hoblet for first introducing me to the 
question of party valuation in Ponzi schemes and for his helpful comments and sugges-
tions on projects that were the genesis of this argument. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The impetus of the global financial crisis resulted in the revelation that 
many of the world’s most revered financial institutions were neither 
properly capitalized nor as well secured as they led investors to believe.1 
In addition to sparking the government bailout of banks, insurance com-
panies, and the auto industry,2 the devaluation of equities resulted in the 
discovery3 of a number of major Ponzi schemes4 that collectively will cost 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET & JEAN TIROLE, 
BALANCING THE BANKS: GLOBAL LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 14 (Keith Tribe 
trans., 2010); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 12 (2008). 
2 Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 
470 (2010) (discussing the difficult choice between allowing companies to go bankrupt or 
providing government funds to maintain their solvency); Frederick Tung, The Great 
Bailout of 2008–09, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 333, 333–34 (2009) (detailing the acqui-
sition of Bear Stearns, the fall of Lehman Brothers, and government assistance for AIG, 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, et cetera). See generally J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the 
Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (2010) (dis-
cussing the Troubled Asset Relief Program bailout and its after-effects for the financial 
and automotive sectors). 
3 An otherwise insolvent Ponzi scheme is able to continue to function as long as it ob-
tains new capital to cover all demands for withdrawal of funds from its creditors. The 
correction in global economic markets exposed such schemes by increasing the demand 
for liquidation and withdrawal of capital from nonexistent investments without the infu-
sion of new capital to cover the calls. Unfortunately, it is only in periods of economic 
correction that the most successful schemes are ultimately exposed. See Caitlin Hall, The 
Death of a Defense: How Derivatives Spell the End of the Good Faith Defense to Fraud-
ulent Transfer Actions in Business Bankruptcies, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 152, 161 (2011) 
(“The typical Ponzi Scheme is insolvent from its inception.” This is because every inves-
tor in a Ponzi scheme becomes at the same time a creditor); see also Craig Lutterbein, 
Note, “Fraud and Deceit Abound” but Do the Bankruptcy Courts Really Believe Every-
one Is Crooked: The Bayou Decision and the Narrowing of “Good Faith”, 18 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 405, 406 (2010) (explaining the insolvency created by Ponzi 
schemes). 
4 The term “Ponzi scheme” was first coined in the 1920s after Charles Ponzi, an Ital-
ian immigrant living in Boston, went from obscure salesman with $150 in capital to a 
multimillionaire in less than six months by claiming to trade in international postal cou-
pons and promising returns of one hundred percent interest. The subsequent collapse of 
his fraud, resulting in his immediate bankruptcy, captivated the imagination of the coun-
try. Peter S. Kim, Navigating the Safe Harbors: Two Bright Line Rules to Assist Courts 
in Applying the Stockbroker Defense and the Good Faith Defense, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 657, 673–74 & n.68 (2008); see also Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1924) 
(holding that preferential payments after the discovery of fraud from Ponzi’s postal 
scheme were recoverable by other creditors). 
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investors tens of billions of dollars.5 These include the Bayou Group 
LLC,6 the Tom Petters scheme,7 Dreier LLP,8 and the now infamous Ber-
nie Madoff scandal.9 Courts are just starting to come to grips with disman-
tling the shell companies, fictitious accounts, illusory insurance policies, 
and questionable operations upon which these schemes relied, attempting 
to return whatever possible to the innocent investors.10 
This process will invariably produce new regulation intended to un-
cover such fraudulent schemes, beginning with the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act11 and the promulgation of 
new rules by regulators—both national and international—designed to 
improve the transparency of the global financial system.12 Other proposals 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., David A. Gradwohl & Karin Corbett, Equity Receiverships for Ponzi 
Schemes, 34 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 181, 182 (2010) (noting that the loss to innocent 
investors in the Madoff scheme alone was more than fifty billion dollars). 
6 Christian Bros. High Sch. Endowment v. Bayou No Leverage Fund, LLC (In re 
Bayou Group, LLC), 439 B.R. 284, 328 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (reversing a previous 
default judgment and ordering claims to proceed to trial); Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC 
v. Redwood Growth Partners (In re Bayou Group, LLC), 396 B.R. 810, 823 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2008) (involving the loss of more than $250 million in principal to investors in 
a fraudulent hedge fund operation). 
7 United States v. Petters, No. 08-5348 ADM/JSM, 2009 WL 803482, at *1 (D. Minn. 
Mar. 25, 2009) (providing background on the criminal case against Petters, who is ac-
cused of bilking investors out of more than three billion dollars); see also In re Petters 
Co., 425 B.R. 534, 538 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010) (noting that the bankruptcy trustee ap-
pointed in the Chapter 11 proceedings will continue to serve as trustee for all investors 
and be charged with creating a plan for the court’s approval to recover, allocate, and 
distribute remaining assets). 
8 United States v. Dreier, 682 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (criminal case); In re 
Dreier LLP, 429 B.R. 112, 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (civil suit by creditors against 
Dreier’s bankrupt estate, wherein the total loss was approximately thirty million dollars). 
9 United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (criminal case); SEC 
v. Madoff, No. 08 Civ. 10791 (LLS), 2009 WL 721712, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009) 
(noting that the total loss to all investors could be as much as fifty billion dollars). See 
generally Tally M. Wiener, On the Clawbacks in the Madoff Liquidation Proceeding, 15 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 221 (2009) (analyzing clawbacks through a case study of 
the Bernard Madoff litigation). 
10 See sources cited supra notes 6–9. 
11 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
12 The new banking rules, now known as Basel III, are perhaps the most obvious 
change to the international financial system in response to the economic crisis. For a 
discussion of those rules approved by the G-20 and a summary of what they may mean 
for the global financial system, see Jack Ewing, Special Report: Davos 2011; Few Signs 
of United Approach to Financial Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2011, at B5. For a 
discussion of how effectively domestic and international financial regulatory institutions 
work together, with some consideration of the implementation of the Basel III rules, see 
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would go even further.13 While the courts battle over the remaining as-
sets—which by the very nature of the fraud are substantially smaller than 
the principal that creditors extended to the schemes—and regulators fur-
ther standardize the accounting, allocation, and distribution of the remain-
ing assets of a Ponzi scheme, there remains an open question of how the 
billions of dollars of lost value can be allocated among those creditors who 
are entitled to it and who are largely equally innocent. Should all investors 
bear the costs of fraud equally? Ought those with security interests be 
better protected by the courts and be the first to take from among the re-
maining assets? Is it equitable if, after secured interests are distributed, 
there is virtually nothing left for the unsecured creditors? What if the re-
maining assets amount to even less than the secured interests? Because a 
Ponzi scheme relies on a constant inflow of funds to perpetuate the fraud, 
should those who were induced to invest first be compensated differently 
from those who invested last?14 What about the opportunity of a party to 
discover the fraud? These open questions will be teased out and litigated 
in state and federal courts for the better part of the next decade. Courts 
will inevitably come to different conclusions requiring appellate clarifica-
tion, and assuming an ultimate split among the circuits,15 final determina-
tion by the Supreme Court itself.16 
To that end, this Article sets out the various methods of determining 
the recoverable loss of each party, and argues that the most equitable solu-
tion is grounded on principles founded in civil law, but refined and devel-
oped in the criminal prosecution of Ponzi scheme operators. Known alter-
nately as the “rescission and restitution method,”17 or “the loss to losing 
                                                                                                                         
generally Daniel Hemel, Note, Regulatory Consolidation and Cross-Border Coordina-
tion: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 213 (2011). 
13 See, e.g., Ponzi Scheme Investor Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 5032, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (seeking to “provide insurance coverage for certain indirect investors caught in 
Ponzi schemes”). 
14 See Lutterbein, supra note 3, at 406. 
15 A split is already emerging between the use of the net investment method favored 
by the Second Circuit, the rescission and restitution method popularized by the Ninth 
Circuit, and the loss to the losing victim method promulgated by the Eighth Circuit. Each 
method is defined and evaluated in Part III of this Article, infra. 
16 The Supreme Court’s docket is largely discretionary. One of the most important 
factors for whether the Court will agree to hear a case is whether a split exists among 
federal appellate courts. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (“[A] United States court of appeals has 
entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals 
on the same important matter.”). 
17 Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he investors were duped into buying modules, and because of that, they had claims 
for rescission and restitution which arose at the time of purchase.” (citing In re United 
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victims method,”18 this principle of allocating loss accurately compensates 
all parties for the actual and realized losses they have sustained, without 
the unfairness that is endemic in other methodologies, particularly the 
recently popular “net investment approach.”19 It has the added benefit of 
unifying the criminal and civil proceedings, saving both time and judicial 
resources as the calculation of loss among all civil parties can be simply 
aggregated to determine the quantifiable loss with which the Ponzi scheme 
operator is charged in the criminal proceedings. 
Part I of this Article lays out the standard of review used by appellate 
courts and the wide latitude district courts receive in approving allocation 
rules among innocent victims in cases of fraud. It argues that a lack of 
discipline among these courts has created uncertainty among both creditor 
victims and receivers, and accordingly needs to be more sharply refined 
into a preference for a single approach. 
Part II looks at the different kinds of creditor victims of a Ponzi 
scheme—mainly those that are secured and those that are unsecured. It 
uses principles of contract law, business law, and securities law to argue 
that secured creditors indeed ought to recover the full amount of their 
secured interest before unsecured creditors are allowed to recover because 
such a rule rewards investors who inquire into the business practices of a 
potential recipient of funds. The nature of a Ponzi scheme ensures that no 
Ponzi scheme operator can offer secured positions for every new investor 
for very long without the scheme being discovered.20 Therefore, incentiv-
                                                                                                                         
Energy Corp., 944 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 1991))); Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. 
Machine Co.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1341 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[I]nvestors in a fraudulent scheme 
clearly had claims for rescission and restitution ... regardless of whether there existed a 
contractual right to the return of principal.” (citing United Energy, 944 F.3d at 596)). 
18 United States v. Orton, 73 F.3d 331, 334 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The proper focus is on the amount of loss for a particular victim. See id. (hold-
ing that, in calculating loss from a Ponzi scheme, the district court correctly calculated 
the loss to the scheme’s victims by using the net loss to the losing victims method); 
United States v. Mount, 966 F.2d 262, 265 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[A] fraud that consists in 
promising 20 ounces of gold but delivering only 10 produces as loss the value of 10 
ounces of gold, not 20.”). 
19 See infra Part III.A. 
20 Each secured interest would require real assets of equivalent value. While one 
could buy real assets with others’ money and use that property to secure additional loans, 
the scheme only works so long as the amount of secured property is equal to the value of 
the funds borrowed. As soon as the Ponzi scheme makes an interest payment to initial 
creditors, or the Ponzi operator absconds with the last loan, the scheme would be discov-
ered and, by virtue of the secured positions, virtually all creditors could fully recover 
their loss. 
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izing secured positions makes it more likely that a fraudulent scheme will 
be uncovered more quickly. 
Part III lays out the basic allocation rules used by receivers and ap-
proved by courts for the allocation of remaining assets and losses when a 
Ponzi scheme finally unravels. It starts with a discussion of the net in-
vestment approach, which is currently the most commonly used rule,21 and 
moves on to discuss two alternate approaches: (1) rescission and restitu-
tion and (2) the loss to the losing victim. Derived alternately from civil 
and criminal law, these allocation methods assign loss differently from the 
net investment approach and are indeed preferable for the unique case of 
Ponzi schemes. While the difference in calculating loss between rescission 
and restitution and the loss to the losing victim is de minimis, the policy 
justifications for each are unique. This Article takes the definite position 
that the better thought-out approach originates in criminal law and is now 
found in the loss to the losing victim method. 
Finally, Part IV makes the case that, when deciding between the dif-
ferent principles articulated by the loss allocation rules, courts must con-
sider the nature of a Ponzi scheme before selecting an allocation method. 
Although the net investment approach may be more appropriate in other 
instances of securities fraud, the unique nature of a Ponzi scheme requires 
an alternative allocation approach that looks not to whatever returns were 
generated, but to the legitimate expectations of equally innocent creditors 
and corrects for time by allocating loss and distributing the remaining 
assets according to the actual and realized losses of the creditors. 
I. COURTS HAVE DISCRETION TO DETERMINE ALLOCATION 
Ponzi schemes are a unique kind of fraud with four basic elements: (1) 
capital infusion from investors, (2) the fraud itself, (3) payments to inves-
tors that necessitate ever-increasing new investment to perpetuate the 
fraud, and (4) “absurdly and unbelievably high” rates of return that induce 
investment.22 The scope of the fraud can cover a myriad of industries,23 
                                                 
21 See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
22 Paul W. Bonapfel, William Hicks, John Mills & Todd Neilson, The Business Bank-
ruptcy Panel Ponzi Schemes—Bankruptcy Court v. Federal Court Equity Receivership, 
26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 207, 207 (2010). 
23 Id. at 208 (“It could be almost any kind of business. We have famous ones, includ-
ing a lot of pay phone deals years ago where people were putting money into pay phones, 
getting not crazy returns but 14% a year or something like that, and the businesses were 
real in that they had thousands of pay phones and money coming in. When you broke 
down the financial analysis, however, the pay phone businesses were losing money.” 
(quoting William Hicks, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission)). 
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but it always involves the Ponzi scheme operator asserting that the inves-
tor’s capital is being used to generate the profit the returns are predicated 
upon, when in reality the capital is being used to pay investors the false 
return on their investment. This induces new investment while permitting 
the Ponzi scheme operator to misappropriate millions of other people’s 
dollars.24 
In cases of fraud, and Ponzi schemes in particular, a receiver is regu-
larly appointed to guard the remaining assets after the fraud is finally un-
covered.25 It is the receiver’s responsibility to protect whatever assets 
remain, liquidating and recovering whatever it can to return as much as 
possible to the innocent investors.26 The receiver, not the court, is the body 
that ultimately makes payments to claimants.27 This often leads to the 
common misperception that it is the receiver, not the court, which is in 
charge of determining the loss of each party and allocating whatever funds 
were recovered among them. 
The district court has broad powers and wide discretion to determine 
the appropriate relief in an equity receivership.28 It is the court, not the 
receiver29 or state law,30 which governs allocation. This makes the receiver 
an officer of the court, not an independent agent;31 although the receiver 
                                                 
24 Lutterbein, supra note 3, at 406 (“In Ponzi schemes, early investors are simply paid 
from the investments of later investors.”). 
25 SEC v. Presto Telecom., Inc., 153 F. App’x 428, 430 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The district 
court did not abuse its discretion by invoking its inherent equitable power to appoint a 
receiver.”); SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The power of a 
district court to impose a receivership or grant other forms of ancillary relief does not in 
the first instance depend on a statutory grant of power from the securities laws. Rather, 
the authority derives from the inherent power of a court of equity to fashion effective 
relief.”). 
26 GARRARD GLENN, THE LAW GOVERNING LIQUIDATION § 312 (1935). 
27 See Crites, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 322 U.S. 408, 414 (1944). 
28 SEC v. Capital Consultants, LLC, 397 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2005) (“‘A district 
court’s power to supervise an equity receivership and to determine the appropriate action 
to be taken in the administration of the receivership is extremely broad.’” (quoting SEC 
v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1986))); see also SEC v. Pension Fund of Am. 
L.C., 377 F. App’x 957, 961 (11th Cir. 2010). 
29 N. Am. Broad., LLC v. United States, 306 F. App’x 371, 373 (9th Cir. 2008). 
30 Dzikowski v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A. (In re Prudential of Fla. Leasing, Inc.), 
478 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he federal rule of single satisfaction requires 
the bankruptcy court to allocate the amount of the settlement that applies to the complaint 
against Northern Trust rather than apply Florida law.”). 
31 N. Am. Broad., LLC, 306 F. App’x at 373 (“The property in his hands is in custodia 
legis; it is the court itself that has the care of the property in dispute. The receiver is but 
the creature of the court having no powers except such as are conferred upon him by the 
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may issue preliminary findings or recommendations regarding the meth-
ods of determination and allocation of loss,32 the court is the agent that 
ultimately reviews and ratifies the receiver’s actions.33 Whenever the 
method of allocation is contested, or the court’s order approving the re-
ceivership is unclear, no creditors will receive satisfaction of their claims 
against a Ponzi scheme operator without the court’s ratification of the 
allocation scheme.34 In practice, Ponzi schemes are notoriously complex 
and often involve hundreds of thousands of pages of discovery.35 The 
receiver may also be working with or fighting against a federal prosecutor 
who is tasked with bringing criminal charges against the accused. At the 
same time, the receiver is managing the bankruptcy and the court is han-
dling a bevy of civil suits.36 The receiver is accordingly in the best posi-
tion to hear the arguments made by all parties, to ascertain the specific 
losses claimed by each creditor, and to try to reconcile these demands with 
the remaining or foreseeably recoverable assets. The receiver’s recom-
mendation to the court regarding the appropriate method of allocating loss 
among equally innocent parties is therefore given considerable weight 
when a court is reviewing whether to approve the proposed allocation.37 
A district court’s decision concerning the supervision of an equitable 
receivership is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.38 The basis for this 
                                                                                                                         
order of his appointment and the course and practice of the court.” (citing Booth v. Clark, 
58 U.S. 322, 331 (1854))). 
32 Id. 
33 Crites, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 322 U.S. 408, 414 (1944) (holding that a 
receiver “was ... an officer or arm of the court. He was appointed to assist the court in 
protecting and preserving, for the benefit of all parties concerned, the properties in the 
court’s custody pending the foreclosure proceedings”); see also Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. 
203, 217–18 (1872). 
34 See Davis, 83 U.S. at 218. 
35 See Ponzi Schemes, PARKMAN, ADAMS & WHITE, http://www.parkmanlawfirm.com 
/practice-areas/ponzi-schemes (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
36 See, e.g., United States v. Dreier, 682 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (criminal 
case); In re Dreier, LLP, 429 B.R. 112 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (civil suit) (illustrating a 
criminal and civil suit proceeding simultaneously for the same Ponzi scheme). 
37 SEC v. Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d 166, 175 (2009) (noting that the court “give[s] 
weight to the Receiver’s judgment”). 
38 SEC v. Loving Spirit Found., Inc., 392 F.3d 486, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he dis-
trict court exercised its ‘extremely broad’ supervisory power over an ongoing receiver-
ship.” (quoting SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1986))); SEC v. Lincoln 
Thrift Ass’n, 577 F.2d 600, 606–09 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The question to be resolved by this 
Court, then, is whether the district court judge abused his discretion in failing to grant 
appellant creditors the relief they sought.”); see also SEC v. Safety Fin. Serv., Inc., 674 
F.2d 368, 372–73 (5th Cir. 1982); SEC v. An-Car Oil Co., 604 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 
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broad deference to the district court’s supervisory role in equity receiver-
ships arises out of the fact that most receiverships involve multiple parties 
and complex transactions, so an appellate court need not interfere in the 
minutiae of ongoing proceedings once the case has been managed, first by 
the receiver and then by a trial court.39 The amount of deference provided 
to the allocation judgments of district courts makes intuitive sense. A trial 
judge spends countless hours in a large and complex fraud case evaluating 
the claims of a variety of parties, from individual investors to insurance 
companies, and from banks that extended lines of credit to commercial 
real estate companies that hold contracts with defaulted lease payments. 
The creditors can number in the thousands or tens of thousands depending 
upon the scale of the fraud.40 Reviewing the lower court record solely for 
abuse of discretion allows these complex and burdensome cases to be 
more expeditiously completed and conserves judicial resources (both time 
and expense) that would have to be expended if review approached a de 
novo standard. As a corollary, district courts have a great deal of leeway 
when it comes to ratifying different methods to determine loss and allocate 
assets.41 Confident that the standard of review is broad enough to permit 
them to independently evaluate the parties and the facts to determine the 
most equitable methodology to allocate loss without concerning them-
selves with the possibility of being overturned on appeal, trial courts have 
not settled on a single predictable and uniform rule for allocation that 
would protect the reasonable expectations of all parties. Rather, courts 
have adopted a variety of methods to allocate loss based on the facts of 
each case.42 
The lack of discipline by district courts to use a single method is prob-
lematic, achieving neither the predictability nor the uniformity of result 
                                                                                                                         
1979) (“[O]ur review is limited to determining whether [the court’s broad range of] 
discretion has been abused.”). 
39 SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that “a court overseeing 
a receivership is accorded ‘wide discretionary powers’ in light of ‘the concern for orderly 
administration’” (quoting Safety Fin. Serv. Inc., 674 F.2d at 373)). 
40 A list of victims of the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme numbered more than 13,500 
accounts. See Duncan Greenburg & Matthew Miller, The Madoff Ponzi: Madoff’s Bil-
lionaire Victims, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/05/bernard-m 
adoff-billionaires-business-billionaires-0205_madoff.html (noting, however, that “the 
number of [individual] people Madoff defrauded is likely less than that because many 
victims held several accounts with his firm”). 
41 United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 632 (2010). 
42 These include the net investment method, the rescission and restitution method, and 
the loss to the losing victim method. Each of these methods, and their comparative mer-
its, are discussed further infra Parts III.A–C, respectively. 
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that parties expect from bankruptcy courts. A failure to settle upon a single 
loss allocation rule disrupts the reasonable expectations of future creditors 
and may hinder investment in perfectly legitimate businesses. Serious 
problems arise when determining valuation because different receivers 
propose different methods of allocating loss among potential creditors. 
When the courts affirm these various methods, it creates a patchwork of 
diverse methodologies, with virtually no criterion to choose between the 
various allocation calculations.43 Receivers, creditors, and the financial 
system as a whole would benefit from rules so clearly articulated as to 
approach a single standard method of determining loss in situations of 
securities fraud. For reasons provided in Parts III and IV of this Article, 
that allocation rule ought to be the loss to the losing victim method. 
II. SECURED VERSUS UNSECURED CREDITORS 
Before addressing the allocation of loss among innocent victims in a 
Ponzi scheme, it is first necessary to briefly discuss the different classes of 
creditors. It has long been established that similarly situated creditors 
ought to be treated similarly;44 however, there is an open question regard-
ing which parties are properly termed “similarly situated.” While there can 
be no doubt that superficial differences45 do not justify special treatment, 
whether a party is a secured creditor does justify distinct treatment for 
purposes of allocation of recovery. 
The law has long distinguished secured from unsecured claimants: 
“[A]ll creditors similarly situated are treated equally; secured creditors are 
given advantages that unsecured creditors do not have.”46 The Supreme 
                                                 
43 The result is that courts apply different allocation methodologies to different sets of 
facts and adopt allocation rules that most neatly comport to the transaction’s paper trail. 
While there are obvious advantages to a flexible system, these advantages are dwarfed by 
the inefficiency and uncertainty ultimately created. What results is a nearly endless ap-
peal process on the question of validation, which slows liquidation and distribution, and 
is accordingly inequitable and inefficient. 
44 Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477 (2004) (“[T]he court should aim to 
treat similarly situated creditors similarly, and to ensure that an objective economic 
analysis would suggest the debtor’s interest payments will adequately compensate all 
such creditors for the time value of their money and the risk of default.” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
45 Examples of such superficial differences include agreements entered into on differ-
ent days of the week, on different dates, for different amounts of money, with different 
rates of interest, in different locations, et cetera. 
46 In re Nixon, 34 F.2d 667, 669 (N.D. Okla. 1929). 
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Court agrees.47 This preferential treatment is why one seeks out invest-
ment opportunities with the attenuated securities. Parties that make unse-
cured loans in different amounts, on different days, for different term 
lengths, and at different rates of interest may all be properly considered 
similarly situated; however, a secured party, one that conditions their par-
ticipation on a secured interest in property or other form of security is, as 
case law demonstrates, fundamentally in a different class than unsecured 
creditors.48 
Is this equitable? Yes. In a Ponzi scheme the recoverable assets will 
eventually be fixed, meaning that a gain to one party is a loss to all others, 
because recovery is essentially zero-sum.49 Yet parties still have an incen-
tive to cooperate: regardless of whether they hold a secured or unsecured 
claim, all parties have an incentive to defeat claims that are “false, exag-
gerated, time-barred, defensible on the merits, or otherwise avoidable.”50 
Secured and unsecured parties will also collaborate to dismiss indirect 
claimants whose loss was created when they invested in an entity that then 
reinvested their funds in the Ponzi scheme.51 These individuals have a 
claim against the party they directly placed their capital with, which will 
in turn bring claims properly against the Ponzi scheme itself, thus prevent-
ing an investor from recovering twice.52 Finally, they are also incentivized 
to work together to find all possible assets, whether secured or unsecured, 
                                                 
47 Till, 541 U.S. at 477 n.16; see also id. at 504 n.15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distin-
guishing between secured and unsecured creditors as fundamentally different classes of 
creditors in a bankruptcy). 
48 Cynthia Futter & Anne E. Wells, What to Expect from Hedge Funds Today and in 
the Future: An Overview and Insolvency Perspective, 29 CAL. BANKR. J. 213, 242–43 
(2007) (discussing the different rights of secured and unsecured creditors). 
49 David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1635, 1652 (1998) (“Whatever risk is removed from the secured creditor’s claim is added 
to the unsecured creditors’ claims.”). 
50 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of 
the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1891 (1998) (“Although there 
are conflicts of interest among creditors, there are also common interests, and these 
common interests predominate in the usual case. This configuration of interests permits 
and justifies a representative action aimed at collecting the assets and regulating their 
distribution.”). 
51 Christine Hurt, Evil Has a New Name (and a New Narrative): Bernard Madoff, 
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 971 (2009) (discussing indirect victims of a Ponzi scheme 
who are “individual clients of feeder funds” which invested clients’ funds into the fraudu-
lent scheme). 
52 Id. (noting that the feeder fund may be compensated as any other victim of the 
Ponzi scheme, and “indirect investors have the ability to sue the fund in which they 
invested for fraud or negligence”). 
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because this will increase the ultimate size of the pool of assets for all 
claimants.53 
Treating secured and unsecured creditors separately also provides all 
parties with the benefit of their bargain.54 When the parties contract for a 
secured interest in collateral, and the eventual assets available are insuffi-
cient to cover the pledged commitment, “secured creditors are given the 
benefit of their bargain and various protections, such as adequate protec-
tion of their secured interest.”55 While there have been instances when a 
court has denied a supposedly secured creditor the benefit of its secured 
position because the mortgages used to secure the investment were im-
properly recorded,56 and denied preferential treatment when the claimant 
had already been made whole,57 there are no instances of a court treating a 
properly secured creditor and unsecured creditor as similarly situated 
victims of a Ponzi scheme.58 
Certainly, there are occasions where the amount of recovered capital is 
less than the total secured claims of creditors.59 In these instances, the 
unsecured creditors, while not legally barred from recovery, will function-
                                                 
53 Hazard, Gedid & Sowle, supra note 50, at 1891. 
54 In re Moulton Excavating, 143 B.R. 955, 956 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992) (stating that 
secured creditors should not be “deprived of the benefit of their bargain”). 
55 In re Berry Good LLC, 400 B.R. 741, 746 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2008). 
56 Corporate Fin., Inc. v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. (In re Corporate Fin., 
Inc.), 221 B.R. 671, 677 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that the initial investors were 
not treated as secured creditors because “the mortgage loans to which they contributed 
were not properly recorded,” and also finding that the mortgages were secured for a 
group of investors through the scheme, thus making the investors not direct participants 
in the mortgage transaction and therefore not entitling them to a secured position). 
57 First Am. Title Ins. v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 27-CV-05-7830 (Minn. State 
Dist., Feb. 15, 2007) (recognizing different classes of creditors, holding that funds held in 
escrow were available only to third parties and not general creditors, and that because 
Countrywide had already “received substantial reimbursement of its losses,” it was not 
entitled to recover in the present action). 
58 Dana Yankowitz, Comment, “I Could Have Exempted It Anyway”: Can a Trustee 
Avoid a Debtor’s Prepetition Transfer of Exemptible Property?, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. 
J. 217, 223 n.25 (2006) (“The Bankruptcy Code provides payment to creditors based on 
classification of their claims. See [11 U.S.C.] § 1129(a)(7)–(8) [2000]. ‘Similarly situat-
ed’ creditors are those creditors that are grouped in the same class (i.e., fully secured 
creditors, partially secured creditors, unsecured creditors, etc.). The policy of equality of 
distribution is referred to as ‘equal treatment of similarly situated creditors since the 
distribution provisions of the [Bankruptcy] Code are aimed at maintaining equality within 
distinct classes of creditors.’” (quoting Rafael I. Pardo, On Proof of Preferential Effect, 
55 ALA. L. REV. 283, 326 n.11 (2004))). 
59 See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INGRID MICHELSEN HILLINGER & MICHAEL G. 
HILLINGER, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 18 (3d ed. 
2003). 
322 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:309 
 
ally recover nothing because they take only after the secured claims have 
been satisfied.60 This result, however inequitable it may appear on its face, 
is a logical construction of existing bankruptcy and securities law.61 It has 
the added benefit of being both predictable and uniform: sophisticated and 
unsophisticated creditors alike recognize that a security interest (like a lien 
or a mortgage) confers special and specific rights to recover value placed 
in a particular asset.62 The option of perfecting a security interest is avail-
able to all parties equally, and so upholding the secured interest is ulti-
mately fair.63 
Moreover, where assets subject to a security interest in a Ponzi scheme 
have been liquidated for more than the value of the security, the difference 
between the sale price and the amount of the security is returned to the 
pool to be allocated among all unsecured claims.64 When the assets are 
sold for less than the value of the security interest, the secured party can 
preferentially take only the amount realized by the sale of the specific and 
securitized asset, with the difference being rolled over into the secured 
party’s claim from the unsecured pool of funds.65 Accordingly, giving 
credence to security interests does not allow secured creditors to unfairly 
pilfer funds from the larger pool of monies set aside for allocation among 
unsecured creditors, and may even help contribute excess value.66 
Giving equally innocent secured creditors the benefit of their bargain 
is particularly justifiable in instances of securities fraud. Because the as-
                                                 
60 Id. at 20 (noting that an unsecured creditor’s “claim will be satisfied only if and to 
the extent value remains after the secured creditor’s claim is satisfied in full”). 
61 Id. at 21–25 (discussing the theory behind secured credit). 
62 See id. 
63 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1309.301–.342 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 8.9A-301 to -342 (2011) (stating the statutory requirements and processes for perfect-
ing a security interest; notably absent is any language restricting perfection to particular 
parties). 
64 NIMMER, HILLINGER & HILLINGER, supra note 59, at 20. 
65 Kenneth C. Johnston, Kellie M. Johnson & Joseph A. Hummel, Ponzi Schemes and 
Litigation Risks: What Every Financial Services Company Should Know, 14 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 29, 50 (2010) (discussing the principle that from a secured interest, the 
creditor is not entitled to more than the value of her or his security interest when a Ponzi 
scheme is being liquidated and distributed: “contracts arising from a Ponzi scheme are 
‘unenforceable to the extent they purport to give persons a right to payments in excess of 
their initial undertaking’” (quoting SEC v. Madison Real Estate Grp., LLC, 647 F. Supp. 
2d 1271, 1280 (D. Utah 2009))). 
66 The demand by a creditor for a security interest in real assets from the operator of a 
Ponzi scheme increases the likelihood of discovering the scheme. See supra note 20 and 
accompanying text. Where perfecting a security interest does not uncover a scheme, it 
almost certainly forces the operator to park some assets in real or tangible property and 
thus increases the amount of fixed assets that can ultimately be recovered. 
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sets of a Ponzi scheme are limited by the investment put in by prior credi-
tors, a Ponzi scheme operator cannot offer every party a secured interest in 
the full value of their investment for very long without the nature of the 
fraudulent scheme becoming uncovered by savvy investors, title compa-
nies, or the financial system.67 Therefore, incentivizing behavior that en-
courages parties to obtain secured positions is a legitimate means of polic-
ing Ponzi operations. 
In common accord with the above authority, it is clear that while simi-
larly situated creditors may be treated similarly, secured and unsecured 
creditors are not similarly situated.68 Accordingly, equity and law require 
that courts recognize a secured party in a Ponzi scheme and accord that 
secured party the benefit of its security. If the recoverable amount from 
the security is greater than the amount the court determines the secured 
party is eligible to recover, the residue from the liquidation or sale of the 
secured interest can then be allocated pro rata among all other parties. If 
the amount a secured party is eligible to recover is greater than the sum 
total of their secured interest, the secured party can recover the entire 
value of its security, and have its claim to the unsecured funds reduced 
dollar for dollar against the security. In this way, the secured creditor is 
given the benefit of its bargain and all other parties recover a greater share 
of the unsecured assets, producing the only equitable result. 
III. THE MAJOR APPROACHES 
After determining which creditors are properly secured, and what they 
hold as security, the court (or the receiver it appoints) must determine how 
much each claimant is owed. A corollary to the principle that similarly 
situated parties should be treated similarly is that all unsecured parties 
share in whatever assets remain on a pro rata basis.69 While there are sel-
                                                 
67 See supra note 20 (providing a brief discussion of this proposition). 
68 A partially secured creditor is to be treated as a secured creditor for the portion of 
their investment so secured, and an unsecured creditor for the remainder. See Yankowitz, 
supra note 58, at 223 n.25. 
69 See Claire Seaton Rosa, Should Owners Have to Share? An Examination of Forced 
Sharing in the Name of Fairness in Recent Multiple Fraud Victim Cases, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
1331, 1350 (2010) (describing the “pro rata rule for Ponzi schemes: ‘[I]n the case of a 
Ponzi scheme, remaining assets must be distributed to victims on a pro-rata basis unless a 
particular [claimant’s] assets are able to be specifically traced.’” (quoting Adams v. 
Moriarty, 127 P.3d 621, 624 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005))); see also Cunningham v. Brown, 
265 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1924) (“[W]here a fund was composed partly of a defrauded claim-
ant’s money and partly of that of the wrongdoer, it would be presumed that in the fluctua-
tions of the fund it was the wrongdoer’s purpose to draw out the money he could legally 
 
324 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:309 
 
dom disagreements over the principle of pro rata allocation, the amount of 
loss each party is entitled to recover is incredibly contentious. Because the 
trial or district court’s decision concerning the method used to allocate 
loss is reviewed only for abuse of discretion,70 parties compete to convince 
the court to adopt their preferred method. Different ways of measuring 
loss result in substantially different outcomes for the parties, so the stakes 
at this stage are considerably greater than upon subsequent appellate re-
view.71 
Given that the methodology used by the court to allocate loss is so im-
portant, and that courts have adopted different approaches depending upon 
the nature of the case and the specific facts,72 it is necessary to explore the 
divergences between the approaches. After reviewing the more commonly 
applied net investment approach, this Article will posit two alternatives 
that often achieve a different and more equitable result. The first—
rescission and restitution—has been adopted in Ponzi scheme cases by 
civil courts. The second—the loss to the losing victim—comes from crim-
inal law, but is ripe for adaptation in the civil realm. Its underlying princi-
ples and equitable result make it the approach courts should adopt going 
forward. 
A. Net Investment Approach 
The net investment approach is the most common means of allocating 
loss among victims of a fraudulent scheme.73 It stands for the basic propo-
                                                                                                                         
and honestly use rather than that of the claimant, and that the claimant might identify 
what remained as his res and assert his right to it by way of an equitable lien on the 
whole fund, or a proper pro rata share of it.”). 
70 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
71 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Because courts have found any number 
of allocation systems to be reasonable, it is considerably harder to prevail upon appeal 
when the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the most costly and most 
important part of Ponzi scheme litigation is often bound up in the district court over 
questions of the best way to allocate the remaining dollars. 
72 CFTC v. Topworth Int’l, 205 F.3d 1107, 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the “broad 
discretion” courts have in allocating loss among parties in cases of fraud and discussing 
the various methods federal appellate courts have affirmed as within the discretion of the 
district court, including the net investment or “net equity” approach as well as the rescis-
sion and restitution method, which are both considered in greater detail in the following 
sections). 
73 Paul Sinclair & Brendan McPherson, The Sad Tale of Multiple Overlapping Fraud-
ulent Transfers: Part IV, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 70 (2010) (noting that when it comes to the 
method of valuation, “[n]umerous federal courts have noted and discussed this issue in-
depth over many decades.” The authors ultimately point to a trend in favor of the net 
 
2012] ALLOCATING LOSS IN SECURITIES FRAUD 325 
 
sition that “equality is equity,”74 and so no individual should be permitted 
to profit at all, regardless of the nature of the scheme or the circumstances 
surrounding it, when the return on capital did not actually reflect real prof-
its made as a result of investment.75 No matter how innocent the investor, 
and regardless of the amount of money or length of time it was invested, 
absolutely no return on capital is permitted.76 In fact, any overpayment 
made in the guise of “interest” or “return of principal” beyond that which 
was initially invested is eligible for reclamation.77 
Under the net investment approach, an individual creditor’s loss is 
measured by first taking all of the funds loaned out to the Ponzi scheme 
operator from the innocent investor.78 Then, assuming that because the 
scheme did not actually return the promised interest rate the amount of 
real return on that investment is actually zero, the total amount due to the 
creditor is only the amount the creditor loaned out, functionally an invest-
ment at zero percent interest.79 Accordingly, the net investment approach 
assumes that any return on investment is the repayment of principal, or 
                                                                                                                         
investment approach, also known as the “cash in/cash out” or “net equity” method be-
cause it is the simplest for the court to apply). For example, the largest and most well 
publicized Ponzi scheme of the recent economic crisis, Bernard Madoff Investment 
Securities, will allocate the loss of its creditors using the net investment method. See Sec. 
Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Madoff Inv. Sec. (In re Madoff), 429 B.R. 423, 427 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (“On March 1, 2010, after briefing and oral argument, the Court issued a decision 
(the ‘Net Equity Decision’) approving the Trustee’s method of calculating a customer’s 
Net Equity as the amount of cash deposited into the customer’s ... account, less any 
amounts withdrawn from the customer’s ... account (the ‘Net Investment Method’).”). 
74 Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13 (1924). 
75 CFTC v. Equity Fin. Grp., LLC, No. Civ.04-1512 RBK AMD, 2005 WL 2143975, 
at *22 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2005) (noting that the “[r]ecovery of both ‘profits’ and the original 
investment is deemed inequitable under this theory, as a claimant’s original investment 
would be repaid at the expense of equally innocent later investors” (citing In re Tedlock 
Cattle Co., 552 F.2d 1351, 1352–53 (9th Cir. 1977))). 
76 Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 13. 
77 See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
78 See SEC v. Capital Consultants, LLC, 397 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The dis-
tribution plan provides for dividends to clients under a money-in-money-out or ‘MIMO’ 
formula. Under this formula, the client’s net loss is measured by the total amount invest-
ed in private assets (money in) minus the total amount returned to the client before the 
receivership (money out).”). 
79 See In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 371 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Amounts 
shown on the Claimants’ account statements as dividends or interest earned on the bogus 
funds were not included in the calculus.”); Focht v. Athens (In re Old Naples Sec., Inc.), 
311 B.R. 607, 617 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (“Each claimants’ claim must be reduced by any 
amounts the claimant received from [the fraudulent investment firm], whether as ‘inter-
est,’ return of principal, or any other payment.”). 
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perhaps more accurately, a repayment of interest at zero percent with all 
payments in excess of the interest payment credited toward a repayment 
on principal.80 Thus, when a court uses the net investment approach to 
calculate an individual’s loss for the purpose of allocating assets in a Ponzi 
scheme, every dollar returned—whether originally assumed to be the re-
payment of principal or the payment of interest, and regardless of whether 
any of the returned funds were earned by legitimate means—is assumed to 
functionally be a return of principal.81 
The final calculation of the net investment approach is thus measured 
by a combination of dollars in versus dollars out.82 If the end result is that 
the creditor received more return from the scheme (dollars in) than he or 
she is proportionally entitled to, given the total amount of dollars account-
ed for, and adjusting for whatever security interests the parties hold, the 
creditor is responsible for the return of funds.83 Even less equitably, if the 
amount returned to the creditor is less than the amount paid into the 
scheme, but more than the creditor’s pro rata share of the remaining assets, 
                                                 
80 SEC v. Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d 166, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[I]t is important to re-
member that each investor’s recovery comes at the expense of others.”); Focht, 311 B.R. 
at 617 (“No one disputes that the interest payments were not in fact interest at all, but 
were merely portions of other victims’ capital investments.”). 
81 See Capital Consultants, 397 F.3d at 737 n.5 (finding that the net investment ap-
proach concludes that “all principal paydowns, interest payments, or other payments in 
funds, securities, or other property credited to a client’s account” shall be determined to 
be repayments of principal); see also Sinclair & McPherson, supra note 73, at 70 (dis-
cussing the policy arguments against the principle that “equality is equity” and instead 
favoring an allocation scheme that permits the recovery of at least reduced interest, or a 
rate of interest determined by regulation or statute. The justification relies both on inves-
tor expectations and the time value of money.). A more thorough discussion of both of 
these principles is found infra Parts III.B–C. 
82 Sender v. Bronze Grp., Ltd., 380 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the 
net investment approach determines loss by looking strictly at the “cash-in, cash-out” 
history of transactions and then allocating loss among all investors in the same class on a 
strictly pro rata basis); CFTC v. Equity Fin. Grp., No. Civ.04-1512-RBK-AMD, 2005 
WL 2143975, at *22–24 (D.N.J. 2005) (holding that the equities approach to allocating 
loss in the case of a Ponzi scheme required the use of the cash-in cash-out evaluation of 
each innocent investor’s account, followed by a pro rata allocation of remaining assets); 
Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Bernard Madoff Inv. 
Sec. LLC), 424 B.R. 122, 134–35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that the cash-in cash-
out allocation method would be used to allocate loss among investors in the Madoff 
Ponzi scheme). 
83 Hurt, supra note 51, at 971 & n.144 (noting that if the investor does not voluntarily 
return the excess funds to be redistributed to other creditors who received back less than 
their pro rata share of assets, the receiver can “claw back” these overpayments from the 
Ponzi scheme under authority of 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3) (2006)). 
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that difference may also be “clawed back” by the receiver.84 If the end 
result is that the creditor received fewer dollars in return from the scheme 
than she or he would be proportionally entitled to, the creditor will benefit 
by receiving the difference from the receiver.85 Under this supposedly 
equitable approach, investors are not given the benefit of their bargains, 
but are all forced to share equally in the losses of the scheme.86 
The net investment approach is the most common method that courts 
have used to allocate loss among parties in cases of securities fraud.87 It 
has the benefit of being fairly easy to calculate, particularly since neither 
the court nor the receiver need to make a determination regarding whether 
funds were attempts to return principal or payments of interest on princi-
pal invested.88 
However, in the special case of Ponzi schemes, the net investment ap-
proach fails to take into account some fairly basic elements of the fraud. 
The temporal element is the most important. Because an innocent investor 
who lends funds to a Ponzi scheme expecting a large return has actually 
lent funds that permit the scheme to perpetuate itself by inducing new 
investors, the first investor, although as equally innocent as the last inves-
tor, loses considerably more.89 Other equitable considerations concern the 
loss of the investors’ benefit of their bargain, and confounding the rational 
expectations of all parties involved.90 A more thorough discussion of the 
failures of the net investment approach can be found infra Part IV. 
To rectify the many problems associated with the net investment ap-
proach, this Article proposes that, for the special case of Ponzi schemes, 
federal courts should instead distribute loss using one of two less often 
used, but more equitable methods to allocate loss among all victims of a 
Ponzi scheme: the rescission and restitution method or the loss to the los-
ing victim method. 
                                                 
84 Id. at 972 n.145. 
85 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the pro rata allocation re-
quirements under the net investment approach). 
86 In re Tedlock Cattle Co., 552 F.2d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Under the equity 
theory, no investor creditor will receive the benefit of his bargain, but all will share some 
recovery.”). 
87 Sinclair & McPherson, supra note 73, at 68. 
88 Id. at 68–69. 
89 See infra notes 126–27 and accompanying text. 
90 See United States v. Holiusa, 13 F.3d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 1994) (Manion, J., dis-
senting) (disagreeing with the court’s adoption of a “net loss” approach and stating that 
“[t]he only ‘security’ the[] investors had was [the Ponzi scheme operator’s] need to 
periodically transfer some money back in order to con the investors into thinking they 
were getting a good return on their money.”). 
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B. Rescission and Restitution Method 
The rescission and restitution method of allocating the loss of individ-
ual innocent lenders in a Ponzi scheme is taken from principles of both 
contract law and equity.91 It does not intend to discount or reduce the total 
loss as much as possible (which is too often the result of the net invest-
ment approach), but instead aims to compensate parties based upon their 
realized loss.92 It is calculated by taking the principal that each lender was 
induced to provide to the Ponzi scheme operator, and then subsequently 
reducing that amount by the return of all principal.93 Different variations 
on its calculation alternately account dividend reinvestment as principal or 
interest—a determination that is made by the court, and based upon the 
specific facts of each case and the appropriateness of its inclusion given 
the standard business practice of the scheme.94 It notably excludes a reduc-
                                                 
91 Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 BUS. LAW. 569, 570 (2006) 
[hereinafter Kull, Rescission and Restitution] (“This primary ambiguity is frequently 
observable in the vicinity of contracts disputes, where ‘restitution’ sometimes refers to an 
action based on unjust enrichment (normally where the claimant has no contract rights to 
enforce), but sometimes refers to a remedy for breach, available to a party who might 
otherwise seek expectation damages or specific performance.”); Andrew Kull, Rational-
izing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1219 (1995) [hereinafter Kull, Rationalizing 
Restitution] (“When the Restatement of Restitution was adopted in 1936, there was only 
one context in which the word ‘restitution’ was in common use as a legal term. The 
remedy of rescission, available for certain breaches of contract, was frequently called 
‘rescission and restitution.’ This was straightforward descriptive terminology, because 
rescission of a contract, most of the time, is inevitably a two-step process.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
92 See CFTC v. Richwell Int’l, Ltd., 163 B.R. 161, 162–63 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (deciding 
to employ a rescission and restitution plan in order to pay victims “in proportion to their 
total lost money”); In re Trending Cycles for Commodities, Inc., 27 B.R. 709, 710 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (approving a plan under the rescission and restitution formula 
that was “equal to the total out-of-pocket deposit made by a customer minus withdraw-
als”); see also Kull, Rescission and Restitution, supra note 91, at 576 (describing restitu-
tion as a way to “restore to the injured party something previously given to the defendant 
by way of performance, or ... restore the injured party to the precontractual status quo, or 
... do both of these things at once”). 
93 Richwell, 163 B.R. at 162–63. The important difference between the “net invest-
ment” and the “rescission and restitution” method is not that the ultimate loss is allocated 
on a pro rata basis, but rather the total amount of the loss. Richwell is clear that after the 
total loss is determined, the remaining assets are allocated pro rata under the rescission 
and restitution approach. Id. (“[D]istribute the remaining general property to both past 
and present customers pro rata under a rescission and restitution formula, paying them in 
proportion to their total lost money.”). 
94 In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 371 F.3d 68, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2004). A court ap-
plying the rescission and restitution method may determine on a case-by-case basis 
 
2012] ALLOCATING LOSS IN SECURITIES FRAUD 329 
 
tion in the amount returned as interest.95 Using this method, the aggregate 
amount of loss will be significantly greater, because no discount is given 
for the return of interest.96 However, because allocation of loss is pro rata, 
each creditor is still returned the proportional share of loss that he or she is 
entitled to, without sacrificing contract principles or the expectation of 
each individual creditor.97 To avoid excessive profits from willful igno-
rance, the court need only apply its current rules denying recovery to any-
one who knew or should have known that the scheme was fraudulent.98 
The most commonly cited case in favor of the rescission and restitu-
tion approach is Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Richwell 
International Ltd.
99 In Richwell, the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California approved a plan that distributed the remaining assets to 
existing creditors under a scheme that entitled those creditors who made 
profits to claim their entire principal as their loss.100 The court considered 
other approaches, but determined that accounting for the realized gains of 
some parties would legitimize the illegal operation,101 that recovering 
based upon actualized loss better tracked creditor expectations than reduc-
                                                                                                                         
whether any interest or dividends not paid in cash but returned on paper through a divi-
dend reinvestment scheme should be counted as a return of principal for the purpose of 
allocating loss among innocent investors. See id. at 71 (“Instead, each Claimant’s net 
equity should be calculated by reference to the amount of money the Claimants originally 
invested with the Debtors (not including any fictitious interest or dividend reinvest-
ments).”). 
95 See Kull, Rescission and Restitution, supra note 91, at 576 (explaining that the im-
portant difference between the net investment approach and the rescission and restitution 
approach is that while the former discounts the principal deposits by a return on principal 
and interest, the latter only discounts the loss by the amount of the original deposit that 
has been returned as principal). 
96 In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 371 F.3d at 88 (discussing use of the rescission 
and restitution method and taking out the “artificial interest” and “dividend reinvest-
ments” shown in “fictitious account statements” created by the Ponzi scheme operator). 
97 See Kull, Rescission and Restitution, supra note 91, at 577 (discussing the use of 
rescission as a natural remedy of a breach of contract). 
98 Courts have found promised rates of return to be so high that anyone accepting 
them knew or should have known that the scheme was fraudulent and is accordingly 
denied those fictitious profits. Scholes v. Lehman, 56 F.3d 750, 760 (7th Cir. 1995). 
Judge Posner reminds us all that if something sounds too good to be true, it probably is. 
Id. 
99 CFTC v. Richwell Int’l, Ltd., 163 B.R. 161 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
100 Id. at 164. 
101 Id. at 163 (“[T]o impose a constructive trust on specific assets for specific custom-
ers, at the expense of other similarly situated customers, would be inequitable.”). 
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ing the loss by any realized gains,102 and that equity demanded a scheme 
that accounted for the principal.103 
The rescission and restitution method has received support beyond the 
District Court for the Northern District of California, perhaps most notably 
from the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). The SIPC 
believes that expectations of an innocent investor ought to be protected 
even in circumstances, such as a Ponzi scheme, where those expectations 
are inconsistent with the reality of the invested funds.104 The SIPC105 was 
created in response to a federal mandate in the Securities Investor Protec-
tion Act,106 and exists to protect investors in the event of a brokerage fail-
ure.107 The endorsement of the SIPC demonstrates that the rescission and 
restitution method should be considered as a serious alternative to the net 
investment approach. 
Under the Richwell approach, the principal of each creditor’s initial 
loan is used to determine their realized loss and, accordingly, their propor-
tion of recovered assets.108 Transactions in a Ponzi scheme are often much 
closer to that of a lender-borrower relationship than a purely speculative 
                                                 
102 Id. at 164 (“[T]hose who are victims of theft or fraud expect to receive their prop-
erty back if it is possible to actually identify what property is theirs.”). 
103 Id. at 162 & n.1 (noting that equity demands “distribut[ing] remaining customer 
property to existing ‘public customers’ pro rata on the basis of the lesser of (a) current 
account balance on September 23, 1993, and (b) their total net deposits into their margin 
account[]”; the court noted that company insiders and family members, not being public 
customers, are not able to recover as they are the ones who should have known about the 
fraud). 
104 Sinclair & McPherson, supra note 73, at 69 & n.51 (“‘[R]easonable and legitimate 
claimant expectations on the filing date are controlling even where inconsistent with 
transactional reality.’” (quoting Brief of Appellant SIPC at 23–24, In re New Times Sec. 
Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-5527-bk), 2005 WL 5338148)). 
105 Congress mandated SIPC to be a non-profit watchdog and advocate on behalf of 
investors in securities against the exigencies of the market and personal greed endemic in 
such a system. Their mandate and how they are responding to the new instances of fraud 
uncovered by the economic crisis at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century 
can be found at their website. See The SIPC Mission, SECS. INVESTOR PROT. CORP., http: 
//www.sipc.org/who/sipcmission.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
106 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (2006). 
107 SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, HOW SIPC PROTECTS YOU: 
UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.sipc.org/pdf/HSPY_English_2011.pdf. 
108 See Richwell, 163 B.R. at 162 (stating that recovery is based upon “net deposits”); 
see also In re Trending Cycles for Commodities, Inc., 27 B.R. 709, 710 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1983) (indicating that recovery is based upon the total deposits minus any withdrawals). 
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equities investor.109 Innocent creditors are often convinced that they are 
providing funds for business expansion and development rather than spec-
ulating in foreign currencies, stocks, or the bond market.110 Accordingly, 
the rescission and restitution approach better tracks the expectations of all 
creditors and does not unfairly discriminate depending on the rate of re-
turn promised or the length of time the claimant had been involved.111 The 
court in Richwell also concluded that focusing on anything but the princi-
pal loaned and the repayment of principal received would be contrary to 
“public policy,” because it would give the “appearance of legitimacy” to 
the otherwise fraudulent transaction.112 Finally, use of the rescission and 
restitution method ensures equity is achieved better than use of the net 
investment approach by indexing the proportion of recovery of each party 
to the proportion of dollars initially invested, thus giving each party the 
benefit of his or her bargain: “[T]hose who are victims of theft or fraud 
expect to receive their property back if it is possible to actually identify 
what property is theirs.”113 
C. Loss to the Losing Victim Method 
Like the rescission and restitution method that originated as an equita-
ble alternative to the net investment approach,114 the loss to the losing 
victim method attempts to evaluate the loss of each party by conceptualiz-
ing the total amount the Ponzi scheme operator fraudulently induced inno-
cent lenders to contribute and then reducing those losses when appropri-
ate.115 
                                                 
109 Paul Davidson, Is the Current Financial Distress Caused by the Subprime Mort-
gage Crisis a Minsky Moment? Or Is It the Result of Attempting to Securitize Illiquid 
Noncommercial Mortgage Loans?, 30 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 669, 673 (2008). 
110 For example, in the case of Tom Petters, the Ponzi scheme included providing cap-
ital to purchase such well-known brands as Polaroid, Fingerhut, and Sun Country Airline, 
conglomerating these companies into Petters Company Worldwide, and continuing to 
fraudulently induce investors to provide capital for the new corporation. See In re Petters 
Co., 425 B.R. 534, 542 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010). 
111 Richwell, 163 B.R. at 163. 
112 Id.; see also id. at 164 (“[U]ltimately the [rescission and restitution method] effects 
the most equitable compromise. It tracks investor expectations without legitimizing the 
trading operation by recognizing profits ....”). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 162–63. 
115 United States v. Orton, 73 F.3d 331, 334 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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Circuit courts have recognized that Ponzi schemes are a unique kind of 
fraud,116 one in which “any gain realized by an individual investor is de-
signed to lure others into the fraudulent scheme.”117 Ponzi scheme opera-
tors do not provide investors with gains out of the goodness of their hearts 
or to lessen damage to investors, but do so to keep their fraudulent 
schemes running.118 “[T]hose gains may also entice that same investor to 
make further contributions to the fraudulent enterprise. A repeat investor 
is essentially in the same position as a new investor for these purposes.”119 
Accordingly, the loss to the losing victim method holds that “a victim’s 
gains should be used to offset neither losses to another victim nor losses to 
that same victim later on in the scheme.”120 
The justification for the loss to the losing victim method is to ensure 
that all parties are entitled to the benefit of their bargain.121 While the 
method originated in criminal law to ensure that a Ponzi scheme operator 
could not unfairly discount payments made to perpetuate the fraud for 
sentencing purposes, it protects the innocent investor significantly better 
than the net investment approach.122 The loss to the losing victim method 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., id. at 333 (“Fraudulent schemes, however, come in various forms, and 
we must consider the nature of the scheme in determining what method is to be used to 
calculate the harm caused or intended.”); see also United States v. Alfonso, 479 F.3d 570, 
573 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Orton, 73 F.3d at 333). 
117 Alfonso, 479 F.3d at 572; see also Orton, 73 F.3d at 334 (“Indeed, the very nature 
of the scheme contemplates payments to earlier victims in order to sustain and conceal 
the fraudulent conduct.”). 
118 See, e.g., Alfonso, 479 F.3d at 571 (“Alfonso also used the money to perpetuate the 
scheme by providing some individuals with a profit on their investments in order to 
encourage further investment.”). 
119 Id. at 572–73. 
120 Id. at 573; see also United States v. Hartstein, 500 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(applying the loss to the losing victim method, which “precludes the offsetting of one 
victim’s earlier gains or profits against that same victim’s own later losses”); Orton, 73 
F.3d at 334 (“This [loss to losing victim] method takes into consideration the nature of a 
Ponzi scheme by holding a defendant fully accountable for all losses suffered by those 
victims who lose money, but does not allow the defendant to fully benefit from payments 
made to others. It does not reward a defendant who returns money in excess of an indi-
vidual’s initial ‘investment’ solely to entice additional investments and conceal the 
fraudulent conduct.”). 
121 John D. Cline, Calculation of Loss Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 9 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 357, 370 (2000) (“In a Ponzi scheme, early investors are repaid to en-
courage others to invest .... [T]he ‘loss to losing victims’ method ... counts the losses 
suffered by investors who lost all or part of their money without any offset for the 
amounts repaid to other investors.”). 
122 See CFTC v. Richwell Int’l, Ltd., 163 B.R. 161, 163 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (accepting 
the equity argument that calculating each victim’s loss based upon the amount invested 
and discounting only returned principal, not interest, is the most equitable means of 
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determines the loss of each party by calculating the principal invested and 
subtracting the principal repaid, thus arriving at every party’s real and 
actual loss.123 Every dollar repaid against the principal investment reduces 
the claim of an innocent victim by one dollar.124 This better meets the 
expectations of all parties involved who rightly expect that, should some-
thing go wrong with the loan, they will be entitled to recover their princi-
pal. Under the loss to the losing victim method, no party is entitled to 
recover against their principal more than they invested, but each party’s 
loss of principal is fully accounted for without complicated formulas like 
the net investment approach, which discounts the principal to be repaid 
significantly more against some parties than others in ways that defy equi-
ty.125 
Applying the loss to the losing victim method to calculate loss, not on-
ly in criminal cases that prosecute Ponzi scheme operators, but also in 
civil suits that allocate the loss among innocent investors, creates equity 
among all investors regardless of when they invested in the Ponzi scheme. 
This is an element of a Ponzi scheme that is not found in other forms of 
fraud, because, as the court explained in Alfonso, a Ponzi scheme operator 
uses the principal from early investors to attract new investors, to secure 
reinvestment by initial parties, and to perpetuate the fraud, thus uniquely 
damaging the interests of those who invested first.126 Unlike the loss to the 
                                                                                                                         
allocating loss, because it tracks the expectations of the parties, does not discriminate 
among equally innocent investors based upon when they were induced to invest in the 
fraudulent scheme, and does not validate the scheme’s transfer of funds among innocent 
parties). 
123 Frank O. Bowman, III, A Judicious Solution: The Criminal Law Committee Draft 
Redefinition of the “Loss” Concept in Economic Crime Sentencing, 9 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 451, 480 (2000) [hereinafter Bowman, A Judicious Solution] (“In a case involving a 
fraudulent investment scheme, such as a ‘Ponzi scheme,’ the loss shall not be reduced by 
the value of the economic benefit transferred to any investor in the scheme in excess of 
that investor’s principal investment.”); Frank O. Bowman, III, Coping with “Loss”: A 
Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 461, 548 (1998) (describing how a court applied the loss to the losing 
victim method: “[T]he court added up all the losses to victims who actually suffered 
losses, but gave credit to the defendant for repayments made to early victims only to the 
extent of their original investment. The court did not credit the defendant for ‘interest’ 
payments made to early victims above their original investment. The court stated: ‘[This 
method] does not reward a defendant who returns money in excess of an individual’s 
initial ‘investment’ solely to entice additional investments and conceal the fraudulent 
conduct.’”). 
124 Bowman, A Judicious Solution, supra note 123, at 479 n.107. 
125 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
126 United States v. Alfonso, 479 F.3d 570, 571 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Richwell, 163 
B.R. at 163 (finding that removing interest from the equation and focusing solely on the 
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losing victim approach, in a Ponzi scheme, the net investment approach 
penalizes early investors who would not have continued investing in the 
scheme had they known about the fraud.127 These innocent parties deserve 
to recover their principal in the same proportion as investors who arrived 
later, assuming all parties are equally innocent. 
The loss to the losing victim method is not difficult to calculate. The 
court in Alfonso provided a very helpful example,128 wherein one victim 
contributed a total of $301,000 to a Ponzi scheme in two separate invest-
ments, the second being induced by a perceived return from the first.129 
The first contribution of $36,000 in principal yielded $8,000 in profit.130 
The victim was thus induced to invest an additional $265,000, of which 
$110,000 in principal was repaid.131 The Court determined loss by exclud-
ing the interest (gain) realized by the innocent victim; it took the $301,000 
total principal invested by the innocent victim and subtracted only the 
$146,000 of principal repaid (as opposed to the net investment method of 
adding the $8,000 return on the first contribution to the total principal 
repaid, which would result in total repayment of $154,000).132 The allo-
cated loss in this instance is $8,000 greater than the loss calculated using 
the net investment approach.133 The court reasoned that this greater loss 
amount is equitable because of the unique nature of Ponzi schemes; the 
larger second investment would never have been transacted if the fraudu-
lent operator had not returned a significant interest payment on the initial 
amount.134 
                                                                                                                         
principal invested minus the principal returned “would be most equitable in spreading the 
losses amongst current and former customers .... [B]ecause former customers are often 
those who report illegal trading operations, the CFTC asserts that treating all customers 
equally will encourage former customers to report illegal operations such as Richwell.”). 
127 See, e.g., Sender v. C & R Co., 149 B.R. 941, 944–45 (D. Colo. 1992) (“[T]he op-
erator will pay investors who request withdrawals of falsely inflated account balances out 
of new investments, which frequently results in early investors profiting at the expense of 
later investors.”). 
128 Alfonso, 479 F.3d at 571–72 n.3. 
129 Id. at 571 n.3. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 571–72 n.3; see also United States v. Hartstein, 500 F.3d 790, 798–99 & n.4 
(8th Cir. 2007) (reaffirming the same basic fact pattern as the appropriate and equitable 
means of calculating the loss to the losing victim method to determine the loss of an 
individual party in a Ponzi scheme). 
133 Alfonso, 479 F.3d at 571–72 n.3; cf. United States v. Orton, 73 F.3d 331, 334 (11th 
Cir. 1996) (noting that the “‘net loss method’ ... ordinarily underestimates the loss”). 
134 Alfonso, 479 F.3d at 572–73. 
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The loss to the losing victim method has thus far been confined to 
criminal law, when prosecutors attempt to calculate the total amount of 
funds misappropriated by Ponzi scheme operators for sentencing purpos-
es.135 However, because the total amount of loss for each party needs to be 
aggregated in order to determine the appropriate criminal sanction, and its 
principles follow that of an accepted allocation methodology—the rescis-
sion and restitution method described above—it would conserve tremen-
dous judicial resources if courts would adopt the loss to the losing victim’s 
allocation rules to the total loss of each civil creditor in the bankruptcy and 
resulting civil suit. 
IV. EQUITABLE VALUATION: THE SPECIAL CASE OF PONZI SCHEMES 
Having laid out the two traditional civil approaches courts have used 
to allocate loss among parties in a Ponzi scheme,136 and a third approach 
originating in criminal law but providing a reasonable basis and an equita-
ble result if adopted in civil proceedings,137 this Article will now provide 
some qualitative analysis to assist courts in choosing between these alter-
natives. After considering the policy implications of each approach as 
applied to Ponzi schemes, it is clear that courts should deviate from the net 
investment approach in favor of the loss to the losing victim method. By 
consistently accounting for the entire value of the principal put up, and 
reducing that value by any principal returned as dictated by the rescission 
and restitution and the loss to the losing victim methods, courts award all 
innocent creditors the benefit of their bargain, affirm traditional contract 
and equitable principles, and affirm the allocation method that minimizes 
the discretion of the receiver to achieve the most consistent result. 
The rescission and restitution and the loss to the losing victim meth-
ods, unlike the net investment approach, avoid lengthy and costly litiga-
                                                 
135 See, e.g., Orton, 73 F.3d at 334 (affirming the sentencing court’s use of the loss to 
the losing victim method). 
136 See discussion supra Parts III.A–B (discussing the net investment approach and 
the rescission and restitution approach). 
137 See discussion supra Part III.C (discussing the loss to the losing victim method); 
see also Cline, supra note 121, at 370 (“The Eleventh Circuit has identified two potential 
approaches to calculating loss from a Ponzi scheme: (1) the ‘loss to losing victims’ meth-
od, which counts the losses suffered by investors who lost all or part of their money 
without any offset for the amounts repaid to other investors, and (2) the ‘net loss’ meth-
od, which subtracts the total amount the defendant paid out from the total amount he 
received.”). 
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tion138 against innocent parties in an attempt to “claw back” past distribu-
tions139 from wholly innocent investors.140 In clear contravention of the 
parties’ expectations, the net investment approach would sanction the use 
of claw back mechanisms in its ultimate defense of “equality is equity.”141 
By taking back funds that may have been reinvested or spent by innocent 
investors who had no knowledge that their gains were derived from fraud-
ulent investments, the net investment approach purports to do the financial 
system “justice” by properly allocating loss.142 The reality is much more 
devastating. While those innocent investors may be able to claim a tax 
credit—since the return on investment they reported as income and paid 
capital gains taxes on has been clawed back—the loss of that capital, the 
time value of the investment, and the disruption of assets, which may 
require ill-timed liquidation to satisfy the claw back demand, all jeopard-
ize investor confidence in the financial system. 
Rescission and restitution and loss to the losing victim avoid these 
conflicts by denying the receiver the ability to claw back funds returned to 
the creditor to satisfy an obligation, while still ensuring that those respon-
sible for the scheme do not profit from it. Importantly, neither of the latter 
approaches permits investors that participated in the fraud or should have 
known about the fraud from profiting through the scheme.143 While prom-
                                                 
138 See CFTC v. Richwell Int’l, Ltd., 163 B.R. 161, 164 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Jeffery G. 
Hamilton & Robert G. Richardson, Clawback Claims Against Innocent Investors: The 
SEC vs. The Stanford Receiver, 28-OCT AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12 (2009) (questioning the 
reasonability of claw back provisions against innocent investors generally, in cases of 
Ponzi schemes specifically, and noting that in SEC v. Stanford International Bank Ltd. 
the cost of clawing back potentially undue profits is likely significantly greater than the 
profits that will eventually be recaptured). 
139 Thomas A. Dubbs, A Scotch Verdict on “Circularity” and Other Issues, 2009 
WISC. L. REV. 455, 457 (2009) (noting that a theory that requires “a ‘claw back,’ or 
disgorgement, of gains” recognizes that those gains “are obtained by ‘winning’ investors 
who sold their stock in a firm before fraud was disclosed by the firm. [The theory] thus 
assumes that those gains are wrongfully ‘captured,’ and should ultimately be netted 
against instances where such investors ‘lost’ because of fraud announced by another 
firm.”). 
140 See Hurt, supra note 51, at 971–72 (discussing the ability of a receiver to “claw 
back” the interest payments transferred to innocent creditors in compliance with their 
contractual agreements to pay interest on the loans the scheme accepted). 
141 See Sinclair & McPherson, supra note 73, at 69. 
142 Id. 
143 Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund, Ltd.), 359 B.R. 510, 
523 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, 397 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“In 
determining whether or not a transferee lacked the requisite knowledge so as to have been 
acting in good faith, courts look to what the transferee objectively knew or should have 
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ised rates of return by some Ponzi scheme operators are so large as to 
strain credulity, and may in those instances limit the number of innocent 
creditors,144 most schemes have large classes of creditors who are plausi-
bly innocent and thus should be immunized from the claw back principles 
of the net investment approach.145 Individuals who knowingly participate 
in, profit from, or help perpetuate a scheme they know to be fraudulent are 
barred from recovery under any theory of allocation.146 They lose their 
right to any profits wrongfully acquired and face additional civil as well as 
criminal penalties.147 
While each method of allocating the losses from a Ponzi scheme pro-
vides different winners and losers, for a significant subset of those inves-
tors the windfalls made from other investments compensate them for the 
losses attributed to the fraud.148 In the aggregate, investors who are diver-
                                                                                                                         
known in questions of good faith, rather than examining what the transferee actually 
knew from a subjective standpoint.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
144 See, e.g., Scholes v. Lehman, 56 F.3d 750, 760 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Only a very fool-
ish, very naive, very greedy, or very Machiavellian investor would jump at a chance to 
obtain a return on his passive investment of ten to twenty percent a month (the Machia-
vellian being the one who plans to get out early, pocketing his winnings, before the Ponzi 
scheme collapses). It should be obvious that such returns are not available to passive 
investors in any known market, save from the operation of luck.”). 
145 See Bonapfel, Hicks, Mills & Neilson, supra note 22, at 222 (“As to whether or 
not people knew or should have known, I think in recent times, that has been somewhat 
mitigated because the investors that I have dealt with in the past two or three years or 
people that have invested in Ponzi schemes have not gotten exorbitant returns. Some of 
the earlier ones that I dealt with got crazy types of returns, but the ones now are not 
getting exorbitant returns.”). 
146 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2006) (permitting fines and imprisonment against an-
yone who knowingly participates in, profits from, or helps perpetuate fraudulent financial 
transactions such as Ponzi schemes). 
147 Id. § 1956(b)(1). 
148 Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1502 (1996) (“Most market transactions involve persons who have 
traded before and will do so in the future .... An investor who is completely diversified 
will be fully compensated for its trading losses that are due to securities fraud by wind-
falls on other transactions. Such investors have no need for further compensation ob-
tained through litigation.”); see also Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate 
Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Reme-
dies, and the Debate over Entity versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
627, 632 (2007) (“[T]he investor’s loss is not the company’s gain; instead, other investors 
pocket the gain. The other investor might be an executive in on the conspiracy, making it 
essentially an insider trading case, but it is much more likely that the counterparty was 
simply someone lucky enough to be on the right side of the trade. Scholars going back at 
least to Easterbrook and Fischel’s classic analysis have pointed out that the net social 
harm from corporate fraud, therefore, is much less than is evident at first glance because 
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sified, and thus essentially secured, against the risk of securities fraud 
would rather the allocation of loss be divided in a manner that bears the 
lowest costs of administration.149 The rescission and restitution and the 
loss to the losing victim methods accomplish this goal by limiting the 
receiver’s claw back costs to only those investors who were responsible 
for perpetrating the scheme; the methods are thus targeted to return the 
largest sums of invested money with the least cost. Rescission and restitu-
tion then partitions those profits equitably, on a pro rata basis, based upon 
the amount each party lost (was due) at the time the fraud was discov-
ered.150 
While the net investment approach has an appropriate place in valuing 
other kinds of fraud, the latter two methodologies are superior to the net 
investment approach for victims of Ponzi schemes.151 Federal appellate 
courts have expressed a clear preference for the rescission and restitution 
method over the net investment approach, finding that it is more appropri-
ate when the total number of injured claimants is known, the company has 
“detailed accounting records,” and the initial amount of money invested 
for each proper claimant to the suit could be clearly identified such that no 
investor “would be left without recourse.”152 The loss to the losing victim 
method would achieve the same positive approval from federal courts by 
expediting conflict resolution and minimizing excessive litigation should it 
be adapted for civil resolution as well as criminal sanction. 
Moreover, the rescission and restitution and the loss to the losing vic-
tim approaches are far more equitable than the net investment approach. 
Functionally, under the net investment approach, courts are forced to 
choose between either permitting an innocent investor to recover interest 
on an investment where the funds were never used to actually earn a re-
turn, or discount the value of the dollars invested altogether by essentially 
                                                                                                                         
of these offsetting gains to innocent parties, which the law makes no effort to take away.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
149 Alexander, supra note 148, at 1502 (“Some other sanctions regime almost certain-
ly could be better calibrated to achieve those goals, with substantially lower administra-
tive costs.”). 
150 CFTC v. Richwell Int’l, Ltd., 163 B.R. 161, 162–63 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (ordering 
that property be returned to all parties on a pro rata basis based upon the net deposits to 
the account). 
151 CFTC v. Topworth Int’l, 205 F.3d 1107, 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) (reaffirming the 
broad discretion the trial court has to determine a method of allocation, and providing 
that the rescission and restitution method works best when the amount each claimant has 
been fraudulently induced to invest is knowable). 
152 Id. 
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enforcing a loan with no interest, thus depleting the actual and real value 
of the investment because of the time value of money.153 
Almost a century ago, Judge Learned Hand recognized the principle 
that the law, to be equitable, must take into account the time value of 
money: “Whatever may have been our archaic notions about interest, in 
modern financial communities a dollar today is worth more than a dollar 
next year, and to ignore the interval as immaterial is to contradict well-
settled beliefs about value.”154 This principle, when apportioning loss 
among innocent investors in a Ponzi scheme, is not completely lost to-
day.155 As the rescission and restitution method demonstrates, it can be 
just as simple to allocate loss based upon the last account statements of all 
investors or by auditing the financial records kept by the scheme.156 Where 
such records do not exist, or are unreliable, the problem of verifying the 
veracity of the records is no more complicated under the rescission and 
restitution approach than under the net investment approach. Assuming the 
records are reasonably reliable, allocating loss based upon the amount 
owed each creditor at the time the scheme was discovered best reflects the 
investor’s expected total capital eligible for withdrawal, and ensures that 
the innocent victims of the Ponzi scheme are able to realize some value 
accorded to their accounts by the time value of money. 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of the global financial crisis, the next decade will bring 
with it a significant increase in costly and lengthy litigation to dismantle 
and return billions of dollars from Ponzi schemes across the country. As 
courts process the claims of tens of thousands of creditors, they will be 
charged with choosing the allocation methodology for both the loss of 
each creditor and their concomitant distribution or claw back of only a 
portion of the initial investment. 
To reduce costly appeals, conserve judicial resources, and streamline 
the process of winding down a Ponzi scheme, courts need to implement a 
                                                 
153 See Sinclair & McPherson, supra note 73, at 70 (“[I]t would be inexcusable to 
adopt a supposedly equitable formula—whe[n] investors ... have invested money with 
Madoff for years, and some for decades—and to ignore the time value of money.”). 
154 Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Sherman, 2 F.2d 165, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
155 Sinclair & McPherson, supra note 73, at 70 (“[I]t would be an injustice to ignore 
‘the universally accepted fundamental commercial principle that, when you loan an entity 
money for a period of time in good faith, you have given value and are entitled to a 
reasonable return.’” (quoting In re Unified Commercial Capital Inc., 260 B.R. 343, 351 
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001))). 
156 United States v. Orton, 73 F.3d 331, 334 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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uniform method of allocating this loss. Given the comparative merits of 
each method, now is the time to part ways with the rigid and inflexible 
proposition that “equality is equity.” To give all equally innocent creditors 
the benefit of their bargain, courts need to remember that which Judge 
Learned Hand was prescient to note almost a century ago: time effects the 
value of money.157 By moving away from the net investment approach and 
adopting the rescission and restitution method or the loss to the losing 
victim method of allocating loss, courts will do a great service to the ex-
pectations of all players in the financial system. 
                                                 
157 Procter & Gamble, 2 F.2d at 166. 
